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This Paper designs a political economy model of invasive species management in order to 
explore the effectiveness of tariffs in mitigating the risk of invasion.  The revenue-interests 
of the government together with the interests of the lobby group competing with the 
imported agricultural commodity, that is believed to be the vector of invasive species, are 
incorporated in a Nash Bargaining game.  The government, however, also considers the 
impact of tariffs on long run risks of invasion and decides optimal tariffs based upon its 
welfare in the pre and post-invasion scenarios.  Along with the size of the lobby group, 
which is a function of the slope of the demand and supply curves, the weights assigned to 
the various components in the government welfare function too play a key role in 
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 Introduction 
 
There options available to manage invasive species comprise prevention, 
monitoring and control.  Recently, there have been some suggestions regarding the use of 
tariffs as a preventive measure by influencing the import of goods believed to be vectors 
of invasives.  Costello and McAusland (2003) use  a trade model to show that while 
tariffs may lower the rates of invasive species introduction, they may also cause higher 
damages from infestation due to increased domestic production.  Using another trade 
model, McAusland and Costello (2004) look at the role of tariffs combined with 
monitoring efforts in managing invasive species.  They find that while it is optimal to 
employ tariffs for managing invasive species, higher infection rate does not necessarily 
call for higher tariffs.   
While it is important to understand the effectiveness of tariffs in preventing 
against invasion and damages, it must also be recognized that the use of tariff itself is  
guided by a multiplicity of factors, not all them aimed at invasive species control.       
Tariffs have primarily been used to protect domestic industries and to generate revenues 
for the government.  The role of tariffs in mitigating risks of invasion cannot be looked 
upon in isolation of these other roles, as the effectiveness of  tariffs in mitigating the risks 
of invasion could be significantly compromised by these multiple, and often conflicting, 
objectives.    
The role of interest groups in influencing public policy has been a subject of 
concern lately, as new incidences of invasive species, specially the ones that have 
potential of harming humans, animals and plant species alike, have led to questionable 
management strategies.  Recent outbreak in the US of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), commonly known as the mad cow disease, has caused 
widespread concerns over its impact on the beef industry from international trade 
restrictions and subsequent demands for ban of imports from countries thought to 
potential sources of BSE.  Besides causing damages to the domestic beef industry, there 
are significant risks of the disease passing on to the humans (in the form of BSE-CJD).    
When the disease has hosts that span multiple species, potential exists for 
conflicting interests among groups affected by it.  There are similar other cases where 
import competing domestic agricultural industry may lobby to impose tariffs on imported 
agricultural products in the disguise of mitigating invasive species threat.   
  This aspect of influencing public policy has been a subject of intense research in 
the past, albeit, at a more general level where several domestic lobby groups seek to 
protect their interests against competition from imports.  However, not much has been 
done so far to apply such political economy models to understand the interest-groups’ 
influence on invasive species management.  Yet, a lot remains to explore in terms of 
understanding the role of interest groups that are directly affected by invasives and their 
interaction with the government, especially over a long time horizon.    
This paper seeks to explore the role played by domestic lobbying in influencing 
import of certain goods believed to be vectors of invasive species.  While the modeling 
framework follows the lobbying concept as first  formalized by Grossman and Helpman, 
it differs from the existing political economy models in several important regards.  Only a 
single lobby group (the import-competing agricultural sector, in particular) directly 
affected by invasive species is considered here.  While there may exist several other 
lobby groups, the interests of this particular differ from the rest in that it seeks not only to protect against imported goods, but also against their hazards, which could even span the 
rest of the economy.  In order to keep the analysis simple, it is assumed that its interests 
do not conflict with the rest of the existing interest groups, thus allowing the government 
to deal with them separately.  This allows a more detailed modeling of the Nash-
bargaining game between the agricultural group and the government.  Specifically,  the 
long term impacts of tariffs are explored where the government incorporates the post-
invasion scenario in its bargaining objectives.  This is an important feature of the invasive 
species management problem that needs to be incorporated in the political economy 
framework.  Post-invasion scenarios may completely differ from pre-invasion scenarios 
in terms of the lobby groups interests, their ability to make contributions, the weights that 
the government assigns to rest of the economy, etc.  Consequently, long term interests of 
the government may lead to policy outcomes that are completely different from those 
arising from one-shot interactions with the lobby groups.  Yet, due to cumulative nature 
of risks of invasion (accumulating over time and economic activity), if tariffs are imposed 
for protection against invasives, their long term impacts are the ones that are of  particular 
relevance to the society. 
The paper, first, explores one time interaction between government and the lobby 
group by modeling a Nash bargaining game between the two.  Tariffs serve as the control 
instrument that could affect the risk of invasion by restricting import of foreign goods 
competing with the lobbying industry’s goods.  Not any less significantly, tariffs also 
contribute towards government revenues and producer surplus of the lobby group.   
However, the flip side of tariffs is the increase in price of the domestic good in 
consideration, thus causing a reduction in the consumer surplus.  Following the literature on political economy of tariffs, the government is expected to incorporate in its welfare 
the weighted benefits of the producers and consumers of this commodity, besides its own 
revenues and the contributions it receives from lobby groups.   The rest of the economy 
in this model is indirectly featured as the reverse of the weights assigned to this particular 
group of producers and consumers of the commodity.  It is therefore reflected in the 
weights the government assigns to its own revenues as it would eventually use these 
revenues to affect its chances of survival by spending on the rest of the population (and 
other interest groups).  The model then proceeds to consider the dynamic aspect of the 
bargaining game, wherein the benefits from optimal policies following an invasion are 
considered in the pre-invasion policies.  Several scenarios are considered in the post-
invasion situation that range from elimination of tariffs to continuation of bargaining but 
with various  levels of damages to the producing sectors.  The implications of such 
situations on optimal tariffs are considered.  The role of weights assigned to the lobby 
group and the consumers along with the market strength of the lobbyist is found to be 
decisive in influencing the level of tariffs and thus the risk of invasion. 
 
Model   
Let the demand curve facing an economy for a certain good (q), believed to be a 
vector of potential invasives, be given by: 
(1)  q p β α − =  
where p is the price of the commodity and q the quantity demanded.  The domestic 
supply of the same commodity is given by: 
(2)  q p δ θ + =  Assuming the domestic economy to be small so that it is not able to influence the world 
price of the commodity,  , the residual demand for import of the same commodity will 
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The domestic industry producing the good lobbies for tariffs on imports by offering a 
contribution C to the government.  The government’s welfare function includes producer 
surplus of this domestic industry, the consumer surplus of the people consuming the good 
and its own revenues GR besides the contributions C.  The government uses its revenues 
and the contributions to increase its prospects for future survival by spending it directly to 
improve its popularity or indirectly by distributing amongst the entire population.   
  The government puts a weight of a on the producer surplus, b on the consumer 
surplus and (1-a-b) on its own revenues and contributions.  Let τ  be the tariff imposed 
on the import of this commodity and  the price of the commodity after tariffs.  Further, 
noting that for a small economy tariffs are fully converted into an increase in domestic 
prices: 
t p
(4)   
w t p p − = τ
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The next step involves sharing the bounties of tariffs between the government and 
the lobby group through a bargaining game that maximizes the product of their surpluses.   
 
One Time Bargaining Game 
In order to share the rewards from tariffs between the lobby groups and the 
government, a Nash bargaining game is played between the two, which aims at 
maximizing the joint product of their surpluses.  The government’s and industry’s 
surpluses are the difference between their welfare before and after tariffs.  Government 















































Bargaining constraint for the government, defined as the gain to government from tariffs 


































































 Bargaining constraint for the producers, defined as the gain to producers from tariffs 
compared to no tariffs, is given by: 
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The first stage of the Nash bargaining game maximizes the product of the government 




























































































Proposition 1:  
 
1.1  For  the  range  of  tariffs within which bargaining constraints are satisfied, 
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− < b a  and convex other wise.   














− < b a  and convex otherwise.  However, the bargaining 
constraint  for the government always lies below that of the producer.    
1.4  For a given tariff level, higher the weight on consumer surplus, higher would be 
the level of contributions.   
1.5 For a given level of tariffs, the higher the weight on producer surplus, the higher 
would be the level of contributions. 
 
Proof 1.1: If the two bargaining constraints are satisfied, first order condition with respect 
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The contributions vary with the level of tariffs selected by the government as shown by 
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The second order partial derivate of the contribution function shows that it will be convex 
as long as the above relation between the weights is satisfied
2.  But, the first order partial 
derivative reveals that contributions could be falling in tariffs.  However, in order to rule 
out this possibility, let us look at the contribution function as derived in equation (11).  It 
can be easily deduced that the contribution is zero at a level when the tariffs are zero.  
This implies that the contribution function passes through the origin on the plane 
involving contributions and tariffs.  As a consequence, only places where the contribution 
can be falling and still be convex would be when contributions are negative.  This would, 
however, imply that the bargaining constraint for the producer has been violated.  Figure 
below shows the contribution function for a certain combination of parameters. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
Proof 1.2:  The bargaining constraint for the producer is usually concave in tariffs.  This 
can be shown by taking the partial derivate of the producer surplus function with respect 
to tariffs: 
(15) 
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2 The contribution function would be concave only at very high weights on consumer and producer 
surpluses that are close to 1.  Though, not readily apparent from the above condition in (14), this fact can be 
numerically verified.   Note that concavity of the bargaining constraint implies that the gain to the producer from 
tariffs initially increases but eventually falls with tariffs.  As the weights are increased, 
the surplus to the producer from bargaining shrinks, eventually turning to zero.  Further, 
it can be verified that the bargaining constraint is zero when tariffs are zero
3.  From the 















− < b a   
Note that as long as the weights lie within the line specified by the above equation, the 
bargaining constraint would be concave.  
Proof 1.3:   The bargaining constraint for the government is usually concave in tariffs.  
This can be shown by taking the partial derivate of the consumer  surplus function with 
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Note from above that the slope of the constraint would be lower, the larger the values of a 
and  b.  This would imply that as the weights are increased, the gains from revenue 
increases, thus increasing the bargaining surplus.  Rewriting the above as a relation 
                                                 
3 Therefore, it is possible for the bargaining constraint to be concave and yet be non-positive  as weights 
are increased significantly, even before it becomes convex.  Consequently, it is possible that bargaining 
breaks down even when the constraint function is concave.   
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Finally, also note that the bargaining constraint for the government always lies beneath 
that of the producer.  That is, the constraint is more binding over the range of weights on 
consumer and producer surpluses for the government.  This can be easily deduced from 
the fact that the second order derivative of the bargaining constraint, as given by (15) is 
always higher in magnitude as compared to that of the government, as given by (17).  
Intuitively, the producer is not directly affected by the weight on the consumer surplus as 
compared to the government which is directly and indirectly affected by both the weights.   
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
Proof 1.4 : An increase in weight on consumer surplus would lower the government 
revenues for any given level of tariffs as weights on government revenues would fall and 
so would the weighted consumer surplus.  Whereas, an increase in weight on consumer 
surplus, for any given level of tariffs would leave the producer surplus constant.   
Therefore, maximizing the product of surpluses would require that relatively increased 
surplus to the producer be shared with the government thus increasing  contributions. 
 
Proof 1.5:  For any given level of tariffs, an increase in the weight on producer surplus 
would lower the weighted government revenues as ((1-a-b) would fall), but leave the 
producer surplus intact.  This would raise producer surplus relative to government 
revenues, thus increasing contributions.   
 Government as the Stackelberg Leader 
 
In the next stage of the game, the government, acting as a Stackelberg leader, 
selects the level of tariffs in order to maximize its surplus.  In a one period game, 
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In the above equation, the denominator is the second order partial derivate of the 
government’s benefits, GB with respect to tariff.  When a and b are small enough, GB 
will be a concave function.  More specifically, it could be verified that as long as the 
bargaining constraint for the government is satisfied (as given by equation 18), the 
concavity of GB would also hold.  A large denominator in the derivate would mean that 
the GB is falling (or rising ) fast with respect to tariffs, thus lowering tariffs.   
  So far the optimal level of tariff selection only involves maximizing the joint 
profits of interest groups and the government.  In order for tariffs to be justifiable on the 
grounds of mitigating the risk of invasive species, the government must incorporate the 
consequences of invasion into the bargaining game.  However, since risk of invasion is a 
cumulative process primarily affected by economic activity over a sustained period of time, any such effort at modeling risks into tariffs must be done in a multiple time frame.  
In the next section, risks of invasion are explicitly modeled as being affected by the level 
of imports which in turn are affected by the level of tariffs.  The government still plays 
the bargaining game with the lobby group as a one shot game in each period, however, 
being the Stackelberg leader it must incorporate the consequences of tariffs on risks over 
a longer time horizon.   
 
Multiple Periods 
We deviate from the literature on political economy models at this stage by 
making the model dynamic.  The government’s objectives extend beyond a single period.  
Therefore, it must keep in mind the consequences of its current actions on future risks of 
invasion.   
Following Clarke and Reed (1994), the risk of invasion is modeled using a 
survival function S(t) to represent the country’s likelihood of surviving an invasion at 
time period, t. Let T be the moment of invasion. The cumulative probability distribution 
associated with invasion is denoted F(t), where  ). Pr( ) ( t T t F < =  The survivor function 
captures the probability that an invasion has not yet occurred in time t, and represents the 
upper tail of the cumulative probability distribution
4:  
(21)  .   ) ( 1 ) Pr( ) ( t F t T t S − = ≥ =
                                                 
4 Even though the risk of a particular invasive species are affected by such broad measures as prevention, 
and monitoring, here we consider only the incremental risk reduction from tariffs that reduces the import of 
this particular commodity.   
 In each time period it is assumed that the country faces a certain probability of transition 
into the post-invasion state, denoted ) (t λ . This conditional probability,  ) (t λ , is also 
referred to as the hazard rate. The cumulative probability is given by: 
(22)  ,   
) ( 1 ) (
t e t F
µ − − =
where  
(23)    ∫ =
t
ds s q t
0
))) ( ( ( ) ( τ λ µ
and   
(24) ))) ( ( ( ) ( s q t τ λ µ = &  
where ))) ( ( ( s q τ λ  is the hazard rate affected by reduced imports from tariffs.  The 
probability of surviving until any time period t without being invaded is,  . The 
unconditional probability of invasion in an exact period t is the probability of both being 
invaded in period t and not having been invaded prior to that period: 
) (t e
µ −
(25)  . 
) ( ))) ( ( (




Let the hazard rate be defined by: 
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In the above formulation, γ  is the factor that affects the effectiveness of tariffs on hazard 
rate reduction.  The first term under brackets is the point of intersection of the demand 







 in order for the hazard rate to be completely zero.  This would happen when the residual demand for imports is zero.  However, the risk of invasion does 
not necessarily have to be linearly dependent upon the tariffs and consequently the 
quantity imported.  As mentioned above, in presence of complementary policies aimed at 
risk reduction, even a marginal reduction of imported quantities from their status quo 
may lead to significant or complete reduction in risks
5.  This would be made possible by 
having  the value of γ  to be more than 1.   
In the scenario of an invasion, several situations may arise that would adversely or 
positively affect government’s revenues from tariffs and contributions from lobby 
groups.  A forward looking government would seek to maximize its long run expected 
benefits from tariffs and bargaining in the presence of risks.  Government’s long run 
objective function can be defined as
6 : 
















































                                                 
5 Alternative specification of risk evolution may be where:  { } γτ α λ − − =
w p .  This specification would 
be more applicable when the commodity of concern is the only host to the invasive pest and even if the 
imports are reduced to zero, significant risks remain in the form of invasives arriving through other means.  
In that case even the domestic production of the commodity adds to risks and the hazard rate is reduced to 
zero only when there is no production of that good at all. 
6 Note hat all the variables in the objective function would have a time argument but are ignored for 
purposes of simplicity.   where V is the discounted sum of value derived from optimal policies in the aftermath of 
an invasion.  This value function would depend upon specific scenarios that follow an 
invasion.   We discuss some of these scenarios below.   
 
Scenario I: Elimination of Tariffs upon Invasion 
In the simplest case consider that the post-invasion scenario leads to elimination 
of tariffs
7. Let V  be the discounted and weighted sum of consumer and producer 
surpluses in the aftermath of invasive species establishment.  The value function in the 
post establishment scenario can be derived as: 
 



















where d is the per period damages from species establishment to the rest of the economy, 
r is the rate of discount and θ′is the new intercept of the domestic supply curve, 
assuming pest infestation leads to an increase in private fixed costs to the domestic 
firms
8.  The government’s long run objective function, after substituting for the 
contributions as a function of tariffs from above, can be written as: 
(29) 
                                                 
7 International Sanitary and Phytosanitary regulations may call for tariff elimination if the pest has already 
been established.   
8 It is also possible that the supply curve is shifted to the right causing changes in both its slope and 
intercept.  Implications of such a possibility are considered later.   dt e
e
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 Subject to the equation of motion for the hazard rate as given above by (26).  The current 
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where   is the shadow price of cumulative risks,  l µ , and refers to the cost of decreasing 
the cumulative risks marginally by an increase in tariffs.   First order condition with 
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Notice that reducing the cumulative risks reduces the chance of invasion and thereby 
pushes farther into the future the gains to be had in the post-invasion scenario.  Post-
invasion value could either be positive or negative depending upon whether the damages 
                                                 
9 The current value Hamiltonian would be concave in tariffs, thus ensuring a maximum, as long as the 
government’s benefit function is concave. It was shown earlier that concavity would hold as long as the 
weights on consumer and producer surpluses do not exceed a certain threshold as defined by equation (18).   to the rest of the economy   (which are assigned a weight (1-a-b) ) exceed the combined 
sum of gains to the producers, consumers and the government.  In the case when the 
invasive species of concern may have significant economy wide impacts, the post-
invasion value would be negative, implying that the shadow price of cumulative risks be 
negative.  When the post-invasion value is positive, an increase in tariffs would still be 
warranted as long as the pre-invasion value exceeds the post-invasion value.  The optimal 









































− − − − + ′ −
+










































( ) ( }
4





2 2 2 2
&
 
Let  , where m can be thought of as the conditional shadow value of cumulative 
risks
µ le m =
10.  Then  
(33)    λ
µ µ le e l m + = & &
Substituting for  from above we get:  l&
 
(34) 
                                                 
10 Clarke and Reed (1994) define this manipulation as the  shadow price conditional on the fact that the 
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The shadow price of conditional risks is a function of tariffs and also of key parameters 
such as the weights a and b.  In order to understand how the shadow price of cumulative 
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The term inside brackets is nothing but the curvature (or the second order derivative) of 
the instantaneous benefits function.  From the above equation, it is evident that the 
derivative would be negative when the curvature of the instantaneous benefit function is concave.  This would happen when weights on the consumer and producer surplus are not 
too high and therefore satisfy the concavity constraint as derived before.   The expected 
value in the post- invasion scenario in absence of revenues is lower than the benefits in 
the pre-invasion scenario.  Therefore, it pays to lower the chance of getting into that state 
by raising tariffs.  As a consequence, shadow price of cumulative risks would be falling 
as tariff increases, because as tariff increase, the expected post-invasion value falls due to 
reduced risks.  Figure  below shows the graph of 
τ ∂
∂m &
 for a low combinations of the 
weights on consumer and producer surpluses
11.   
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE 
 
Steady State 
Steady state implies  l =0, which would happen when the hazard rate is zero.  Solving 









= .  Note that 
when  γ  is more than one, it is possible for  ) (τ λ µ = & to be zero even before the tariff 
levels reach their maximum possible level at which the residual demand for imported 
goods is zero.  While the existence of such a steady state is a possibility, it would happen 
under extreme scenarios where very high costs from invasion or very low gains to 
consumer surplus prompt maximum possible tariffs.  Consequently, further steady state 
                                                 
11 The time path of tariffs could be derived from equations (32) and (35), however, they get too complex 
for a qualitative analysis.   
 analysis is ignored here.  Instead, we do a brief numerical simulation to explore the role 
of parameters in shaping optimal tariffs.   
 
A Numerical Example 
 
In table 1 we present the results of numerical simulation of the above dynamic 
game using various combinations of elasticities of demand and supply and weights on 
consumer and producer surpluses.  Besides presenting the optimal tariffs and 
contributions, we also present the consumer and producer surpluses before and after 
tariffs
12.  In table 1 below, the first case involves high slopes (low elasticities ) for 
demand and supply curves.  For this case, notice that as the weight on consumer surplus 
increases from .1 to .3, tariff falls.  This is obvious as consumer surplus is significantly 
higher than the producer surplus (given the choice of this parameter set) and a relatively 
small increase in weights on consumer surplus leads to an increase in its weighted value.  
Contributions do not necessarily increase with an increase in weight on the producer 
surplus.  In fact, the highest contributions are when  =.1, b=.2 and the producer is 
obliged to contribute more to maintain a tariff level of 5.3, as the government increases 
its weights on the consumer surplus.  However, as weights on consumer surplus increase 
a
                                                 
12 The simulations were performed in GAMS.  In all of the above cases the tariff and contribution  levels 
stabilized right from the first time period, hence only the first period results are presented.    Fixed 
Parameters:   .  Figures in brackets after the tariff 
in the first column depict the price at which  the residual demand for imports is zero.  
1 , 15 . , 1 , 1 , 1 . , 10 , 1 . = = ′ = = = = =
w p d r θ γ θ α
 to .3, contributions fall to zero as the producer is no more able to compensate the 
government for the loss of higher consumer surplus concomitant with higher tariffs.   
In the next case, when both the slopes of demand and supply curves are low, 
tariffs fall significantly compared to the first case.  Note that the increase in consumer 
surplus far outweighs the increase in producer surplus from this change in slopes.   
Contributions are zero all throughout as the producer is unable to influence the 
governments welfare function due to its own meager surpluses.  Change in tariffs in this 
case is solely dictated by the change in weights on the consumer surplus.  The third case, 
depicts a situation where slope of demand curve is relatively higher.  Note that compared 
to the previous cases, tariffs are significantly lower.  However, this is solely because of a 
reduction in the price at which the residual demand becomes zero.  That is, the 
government in fact, raises tariffs to its maximum possible level.  Note that this policy 
would also lead to a zero hazard rate, thus stabilizing the risks of invasion.  Risk of 
invasion plays a role in affecting tariffs in the previous cases too, through  its affect on 
the post-invasion value function.  It is interesting to note that since there are no revenues 
in the post-invasion scenario, the post-invasion value function is heavily influenced by 
the weight on the consumer surplus.  However, the post-invasion value is never 
significant enough to enforce a higher tariff thus causing corner solution as in this case.  
Further, it was found that as the damages to the rest of the economy from invasion 
increased significantly, even the previous cases showed corner solutions, forcing tariffs at 
their maximum possible levels.  This is because if the damages significantly outweigh the 
gains in the post-invasion scenario, higher tariffs can help mitigate the risks of falling in 
that state.   Finally, in the last case, when the slope of the supply curve is much higher than 
that of the demand curve, tariffs reach their maximum levels.  This happens despite the 
fact that the consumer surplus is significantly larger than the producer surplus.  The 
relative differences in the slopes of the demand and supply curves push the point of zero 
residual demand higher, enabling higher tariffs, and therefore increasing residual demand 
of imported goods (thus increasing revenues) and producer surplus.  Their combined 
effect outweighs the loss in consumer surplus when assigned lower weights.   
 
Though it is possible to get a different set of results from a combination of a 
different set of parameters that assign higher producer surplus than consumer surplus, the 
direction movement of tariffs should be fairly intuitive by now.  The example highlights 
the role of weights and elasticities on the optimal selection of tariffs.  While the weights 
highlight the significance that the government assigns to this particular industry and also 
the rest of the economy (through weights on its own revenues), the slopes of the supply 
and demand curves determine the role the lobby group can play in affecting tariffs.  A 
higher producer surplus also means a higher ability to contribute.  Interestingly, the 
influence of government weights can be counter balanced by the influence of slopes of 
demand and supply as they both directly and indirectly affect government welfare.  The 
significance of risk of invasion too is dependent upon these weights and slopes as they 
affected the welfare in the post-invasion scenario.     While the above simulation analysis is based upon the scenario of no tariffs after 
invasion, several other possibilities exist.  In the next sections we explore such 
possibilities.   
 
Scenario  II:  Bargaining Continues after invasion 
While elimination of tariffs in the post-invasion scenario is one possibility, 
another possibility is that the government retains the tariff structure purely for revenue 
purposes. Now, in the post-invasion scenario, the government maximizes its objective 















































where  θ′is the new intercept of the supply curve for the producers assuming that an 
invasion causes their fixed cost of operation to go up.  C′ is the contribution in the post-
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Note that, since the post-invasion scenario does not involve any further threats of 
invasion, there is no state variable involved there.  As a consequence  would be the 
optimal tariff in each period following an invasion.  For the sake of simplicity, we ignore 
damages (d) to the rest of the economy from an invasion.  Value function in the post-
invasion scenario can be derived as the sum of discounted profits in the long run from the 
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The current value Hamiltonian for maximization of  profits in the pre and post-invasion 
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 is the instantaneous benefits (say, IB-post) in the post-invasion scenario
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is the instantaneous benefits (say, IB-pre) in the pre-invasion scenario.  Note that the 
difference in these benefits is caused due to an increase in the fixed costs of production, 
θ  , for the private sector.  
 
Proposition 2:   
2.1  For any given tariff level,  IB-POST would differ from IB-Pre by a factor f, from  a 
marginal increase in θ .   
2.2  Pre-invasion tariff level would always be higher than the post-invasion tariff level. 
  
Proof 2.1:  In order to see this, let’s look at the impact on IB-post from a marginal change 
in θ .  This change is derived by taking the partial derivative of IB-pre with respect to θ .  
Substituting the value of C from above into (43)and differentiating we get: 
(44)  0
2
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Then, for small  enough changes in θ ,  IB-post can be written as: 
IB-post=IB-pre+ ,  where f represents the marginal change derived above in 
equation (44).   
f pre IB ) ( −
                                                 
13 The instantaneous function IB is the same as the government benefit function GB derived before in the 
one shot game, except with a time argument.   Proof 2.2:  Substituting (44) into the current value Hamiltonian (cvh), the cvh can be 
written as: 
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In the above, the second term under brackets is IB-post which is some fraction of the IB-
pre, evaluated at   .  From equation (44) we also know that  is a negative term.  That 
is, small changes in 
∗ τ f
θ  would invariably lower IB-pre. The two terms under bracket in 
(45) denote a trade-off between the pre and post-invasion instantaneous values, as 
λ
) (t e







) (  at the time of invasion in discounted sum of future benefits  and 
 denotes the chance of the system surviving until time t,  yielding   in each 
period until invasion.  That is, as long as the system is un-invaded, the government 
receives, IB-pre(
) (t e
µ − pre IB −
τ ) in each period and after invasion it receives IB-pre( )(1+f) in each 
period.  Now, we know that the instantaneous benefit is falling in 
∗ τ
θ  from (44), thus 
suggesting IB-pre( ) < IB-pre( ).  That is, if the government imposed a tariff level 
of   in the pre-invasion scenario too, its per period profits would  be higher than those 
in the post-invasion scenario.  But we also know from equation (20) that the tariff level in 
a one shot game is a function of 
∗ ′ τ θ ,
∗ τ θ,
∗ τ





















 From concavity condition of the instantaneous benefit function we know that the 
denominator would be negative, thus making the partial in  (46) negative.  So 
) ( ) ( θ τ θ τ < ′ .  Now when the instantaneous benefits function is increasing but concave in 
tariffs, tariffs in the pre-invasion situation would always be higher than that in the post-
invasion situation, ceteris paribus.  When an infinite horizon as above is concerned, it 
would pay to raise pre-invasion tariffs even higher as it reduces the chances of invasion.   
Next let us look at a case when invasion leads to an alteration in the shape of the 
supply curve, altering its marginal costs, however, leaving the fixed cots intact as before.  
Under such a situation following proposition is made: 
 
Proposition 3:   
3.1  When there is a change in the slope of the cost  curve for private producers following 
an invasion, IB-post differs from IB-pre by a factor g.  





a − > . 




a − > and g is positive.   
 
Proof 3.1: Following similar marginal derivation of the instantaneous function with 
respect toδ  we derive the value of g to be:  (47)
 
{} τ θ τ θ θ τ
δ
) 1 )( ( 2 ) )( 1 2 ( ) )( 1 (
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Contrary to the case of a fixed costs change before, g could be  negative or positive.  
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From equation (20) we know that the terms under second and third brackets in the 
numerator must be negative for any positive tariff level.  Therefore the sign of equation 
(49) would be determined by terms under the fourth bracket in the numerator as: 
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Now, when g is negative, proposition 3.2 follows from similar logic as in propositions 2.2 
.   





 negative as before, the results could go either 




a − > ,   i.e., tariffs in the post-invasion scenario would be 
lower.  However, if the fall in instantaneous profits from a fall in tariffs in the post 
), ( ) ( δ τ δ τ
∗ ∗ < ′invasion scenario is more than compensated by the rise in instantaneous benefits from a 
positive g, pre-invasion tariffs would be lower than the post-invasion tariffs, as lower 
tariffs increase the risks of invasion and make it possible to reap higher post-invasion 
rewards.  When the magnitude of positive g does not compensate for the fall in IB from 
lower tariffs, tariffs in the pre-invasion scenario would be higher.  This situation is 
depicted in figure 4 below.    
INSERT FIGURE 4 BELOW 
    Point Y leads to unambiguously lower instantaneous benefits from an increase in 
δ , whereas point X and Z lead to a lower and higher benefits respectively.   
INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE 
Finally, when both the fixed and variable costs change due to invasion, instantaneous 
benefit functions may intersect, thus making any unambiguous results difficult to predict.   
In the end, let us also  look at a situation where  government readjusts its priorities 
with respect to the lobby group by changing the weights on the producer surplus in the 
post-invasion scenario.  This may happen for several reasons.  For one, a seriously 
damaging pest invasion may change the way rest of the country views the role played by 
the government in combating it.  That is, the government may increase the weights on 
either the consumer or producer surpluses, as it may add to its vote prospects from people 
outside the affected industry.  This might be inferred as a further subjective weighing of 
the monetary rewards to the government from consumer and producer surpluses accruing 
from this particular industry.  The government, on the other hand, may readjust the 
weights downwards after invasion, if the prospects from other lobby groups become 
relatively more bright.  Under this situation the following proposition can be made.  
Proposition 4:  When there is a change in weights on the producer surplus in the post-
invasion  scenario, the post-invasion instantaneous benefits function would differ from 
IB-pre by a factor h.  Post invasion tariffs may be higher or lower compared to pre-
invasion tariff levels. 
Proof 4 :   By taking the partial derivative of the instantaneous benefits function with 
respect to a , the value of h could be derived as:  
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Notice that h could be either positive or negative depending upon whether the third term 
is lower or higher than the first term in the expression for h above.  Further notice that the 
second term encompasses the revenue aspect in government’s instantaneous benefits 
function, where as the first term is the producer surplus.  When the slope of the demand 
curve is low, (low β ), h could be negative implying a fall in the post-invasion IB from an 
increase in government weights on producer surplus.  This happens as the revenue lost 
from such an increase in weights outweighs the gain in weighted producer surplus to the 
government.  This may also happen when the slope of the supply curve is high enough.   
When the instantaneous benefits function is  concave, optimality would require 
the pre-invasion tariffs to be higher than post-invasion tariffs when h is negative.   
However, if the weights assigned to producer surplus in the post-invasion scenario cause 
h to be positive, the post-invasion instantaneous benefits would exceed the pre-invasion 
instantaneous benefits for any given level of tariffs.  This would require lowering of 
tariffs in the pre-invasion scenario below those in the post-invasion scenario so that risks of invasion are raised.  However, ambiguities arise when the joint impact of a change in 
weights and in supply function is considered.  As before, the cvh can de derived as:  
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In the above analysis we have assumed that the post-invasion weights are exogenously 
affected.  However, these weights could be endogenously determined too by the 
government, when multiple lobby groups are considered.   
 
Conclusion 
Though important to invasive species management, the political economy aspect of 
public policies aimed at their control has not deserved much attention in the literature so 
far.  In this paper an effort is made to explore the role of interest groups affected by 
invasive species in affecting import tariffs, thus influencing their effectiveness.  The 
paper borrows from the existing political economy models in the literature to analyze the 
role of lobbyists and policy makers, which are often conflicting to a certain extent, in 
influencing tariffs on particular imported goods.  First, a one period bargaining game is 
designed between the lobby group and the government to derive the relation between 
tariffs and contributions as a function of key parameters such as the weights on the 
consumer and producer surpluses, slopes of demands and supply curves, etc.  While the 
nature of the demand and supply curves highlight the capacity of market in influencing 
public policy, the weights on consumer and producer surpluses highlight the importance 
the government assigns to that particular lobby group and industry.  All key results are 
found to be dependent upon these weights, which signify the role of market size and lobby power in influencing public policy.  It is shown that the contributions are 
increasing and convex in tariffs as long as the bargaining constraints are satisfied and 
weights are not extremely high.  The bargaining constraints themselves are functions of 
the weights on consumer and producer surpluses.  It is shown that the bargaining 
constraints are less binding for the producers as their objective function has fewer 
arguments.  The government, using the contribution function, plays the role of 
Stackelberg leader in deciding the optimal level of tariffs.  Tariffs, in a one shot 
bargaining game, cannot  include the risk of invasion appropriately, as the risk of 
invasion is a cumulative process.  In order to incorporate the risk of invasion and its 
impact on the welfare of the lobby groups and the government, the model is made 
dynamic, with and infinite time horizon.  This extension is important to incorporate the 
cumulative nature of risk-evolution with trade.  Most risks of invasion accrue over time 
and with economic activity.  In order to model these characteristics of threats of invasion, 
the risk of invasion is modeled as a Poisson process.  The post-invasion value function is 
solved for different post-invasion scenarios and incorporated into the pre-invasion 
optimal policy problem.  Numerical simulations throw interesting insights into the 
decision process affecting tariff allocation and specifically, highlight the complexity in 
predicting tariffs when several conflicting interests are involved. The role of risks in 
influencing tariffs is made prominent when the post-invasion scenario value function is 
affected.  This is shown through extension of the model involving different post-invasion 
scenarios.   Finally, tariff levels in the pre-invasion scenario are compared to tariffs in the 
post-invasion scenarios for various cases and key results derived.   When several conflicting interests such as the lobby group, the government and the 
rest of the economy  are involved, the impact of tariffs on risk could be compromised by 
such conflicting considerations.  Further, it is no longer straightforward to predict the 
level of tariffs over time.  This is especially evident from the comparison of pre and post-
invasion tariff levels in the second scenario where pre-invasion tariffs may be lowered if 
the weights on consumer and producer surpluses are not the same after invasion.  Tariffs 
in the pre-invasion scenario could also be higher or lower depending upon the weights on 
producer and consumer surpluses when an invasion leads to a change in the supply 
function for the producer.   
In the first scenario, when the government does not get revenues  in the post-invasion 
period, tariffs may be increased to avoid invasion.  Tariffs are also increased when high 
damages are expected to the rest of the economy in the post-invasion situation.  However, 
when damages occur only to the interest groups concerned, the net impact on tariffs 
would be a function of the weights assigned.   
While the above model assumes the case of an open economy, thus leading to a one-
to-one relation between tariffs and an increase in domestic prices, it is possible that in the 
case of a large economy such a relationship would not hold. That is, an increase in tariffs 
would lead to a less then full transformation into an increase in domestic prices.  Under 
such a scenario, the government may have a higher flexibility in its tariff policies as it 
can increase tariffs without significantly affecting its revenues, as an increase in tariffs 
would not necessarily reduce import demand significantly. However, the net effect, 
including the effect on contributions would be subject to the mix of key parameters 
analyzed above.   References 
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 Table 1: Results of Numerical Simulation using various Weights and Elasticities 
β =1.5, δ =2.5  a=.1, b=.1  a=.1, b=.2  a=.2, b=.1  a=.1, b=.3 
τ (6.3)  5.3 5.3 5.3 2.2 
c  4.7 6.4 4.3 0 
csb,   csa (27,4.6) (27,4.6) (27,4.6) (27,15) 
psb, psa  (.16,7.7) (.16,7.7) (.16,7.7) (.16,1.9) 
β =.5, δ =.5      
τ (5.1)  2.6 2.1 2.7 1.3 
c  0 0 0 0 
csb,   csa (81,41) (81,48) (81,40) (81,59) 
psb, psa  (.81,12.3) (.81,8.9)  (.81,13)  (.81,4.9) 
β =1.5, δ =.5       
τ (2.58)  1.58 1.58 1.58  
c  2.9 3.5 2.51   
csb,   csa (27,18) (27,18) (27,18)  
psb, psa  (.81,6.1) (.81,6.1) (.81,6.1)  
β =.5, δ =2.5      
τ (8.4)  6.2 5.3 6.2 4 
c  0 0 0 0 
csb,   csa (81,8.1) (81,13)  (81,8)  (81,25) 
psb, psa  (.2,10) (.2,8)  (.2,10) (.2,5) Figure 1:  Contributions as a Function of Tariffs 
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 Figure 2:  Producer and Government bargaining Constraints as a Function of 
Tariffs 
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 α =10; β=1.5; θ=.1;δ=2.5; pw=1; a=.1;b=.1 Figure 3:  Time Path of Conditional Shadow Price of Cumulative Risk of Invasion 
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